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Abstract
Recent work has extensively shown that randomized perturbations of neural net-
works can improve robustness to adversarial attacks. The literature is, however,
lacking a detailed compare-and-contrast of the latest proposals to understand what
classes of perturbations work, when they work, and why they work. We contribute
a detailed evaluation that elucidates these questions and benchmarks perturbation
based defenses consistently. In particular, we show five main results: (1) all input
perturbation defenses, whether random or deterministic, are equivalent in their
efficacy, (2) attacks transfer between perturbation defenses so the attackers need
not know the specific type of defense – only that it involves perturbations, (3)
a tuned sequence of noise layers across a network provides the best empirical
robustness, (4) perturbation based defenses offer almost no robustness to adaptive
attacks unless these perturbations are observed during training, and (5) adversarial
examples in a close neighborhood of original inputs show an elevated sensitivity to
perturbations in first and second-order analyses.
1 Introduction
The attacks on Convolutional Neural Networks, such as Carlini & Wagner [7] or PGD [22], generate
strategically placed modifications to induce a deliberate misprediction. Recently, there have been
many defenses against such attacks that use perturbation during inference time and/or training to
improve robustness [12, 27, 36]. The success of perturbation-based defenses suggests that adversarial
examples are not robust themselves, where a small amount of noise can dominate the strategically
placed perturbations rendering them ineffective. However, a detailed understanding of this phe-
nomenon is lacking from the research literature including: (1) what types of perturbations work and
what is their underlying mechanism, (2) is this property specific to certain attacks and architectures,
(3) whether such defenses are effective and how to make them effective, (4) what the magnitude of
perturbations should be, and (5) where to place them in a network.
We first analyze the inference-time input perturbations, where the input to the network is manipulated
prior to inference. The main trade-off is a selection of the perturbation strength to carefully mitigate
prediction errors over true examples but maximize recovery of the adversarial examples. Interestingly
enough, we find that this trade-off is consistent across very different families of perturbations, where
the relationship between channel distortion (effective perturbation of the input) and robustness is
very similar. One might think that a frequency-based or JPEG based defense should be more tuned
to a natural image classification setting—but we do not find that this is the case. The particular
distribution of noise added to the inference process is not as important as its magnitude.
The unification of input perturbation defenses gives us an insight into how an attacker might avoid
them even if they did not know the particular defense. Our experiments suggest that all the input
perturbation defenses are vulnerable to the same types of attack strategy where the attacker simply
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finds an adversarial example further away from the original image. This optimization procedure
can be tuned to find the smallest distance from the original image that closes a “recovery window”
(demonstrated in our experiments). We can further optimize this distance with a generic attacker that
assumes a particularly strong perturbation, based on the additive Laplace noise. Adaptive attacks
designed on this channel are often successful against other defenses. This result implies that input
perturbation defenses are simply not effective and attackers can easily circumvent them without much
knowledge about the particular defense.
Our experiments compare different placements of noise layers across the network. In general, we
find that the most effective current defenses leverage a strategy used in RobustNet [20], which adds
noise throughout the network. On the other hand, we show that simply adding noise in a single layer,
as in [19], is ineffective in practice. We also find that training the network with this noise is crucial
for high accuracy, and there is a threshold of perturbation after which a network must be trained
with the noise to achieve any reasonable performance (approximately the standard deviation of a
perturbed tensor). Our empirical findings indicate that the injection of noise into internal layers is
an important and effective defense that can be combined with adversarial training [22] to further
improve robustness.
We believe that our analyses are valuable to the community as they highlight important properties of
perturbation-based defenses and the principles of constructing new strong defenses.
2 Related Work
Much of the community’s current understanding of adversarial sensitivity in neural networks is based
on the seminal work by Szegedy et al. [30]. Multiple contemporaneous works also studied different
aspects of this problem, postulating linearity and over-parametrization as possible explanations [4, 14].
Since the beginning of this line of work, the connection between compression and adversarial ro-
bustness has been recognized. Researchers noticed this property a few years ago with a number of
inference-time “input perturbation” defenses, for example, feature squeezing [35], JPEG compres-
sion [12], randomized smoothing [8], and types of structured perturbations [18, 38, 15]. Other main
defense strategies include: the idea of defensive network distillation1 [23], quantizing inputs using
thermometer encoding [6], frequency-based compression harnessed by [2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 15, 21].
Another highly related line of research leverages randomization for adversarial robustness: pixel
deflection [24], random resizing and padding of the input image [34], total variance minimization [15],
dropout randomization [13], random pixel elimination followed by matrix estimation [36]. More
effective perturbation-based defenses are possible by injecting noise to the internal layers [19, 20],
model parameters [17], or via a separately trained auto-encoder added in front of a network [19]. There
are also defenses based on random perturbations that give proven guarantees of robustness [8, 19, 38].
More recent work focuses on a combination of randomized smoothing with adversarial training and
achieves state of the art in terms of the provable robustness [28].
Despite all of this research and several theoretical results, the empirical success of these approaches
has not completely been established. Many aforementioned defenses were later broken [1, 7, 32],
and many recent defenses have not been compared against each other in a standard-setting. This
motivates our analysis.
3 Theoretical Background
3.1 Notation and Metrics
We consider convolutional neural networks that take w × h (width times height) RGB digital images
as input, giving an example space of X ∈ (255)w×h×3, where (z) denotes the integer numbers from
0 to z. We consider a discrete label space of k classes represented as a confidence value Y ∈ [0, 1]k.
Neural networks are parametrized functions (by a weight vector θ) between the example and label
spaces f(x; θ) : X 7→ Y . An adversarial input xadv is a perturbation of a correctly predicted
example x that is incorrectly predicted by f : f(x) 6= f(xadv) The distortion is the `2 error between
1The distillation is a form of compression, however, the defensive distillation does not result in smaller
models.
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the original example and the adversarial one: δadv = ‖x− xadv‖2. We focus on white-box attacks
where the adversary has access to a parametric description of the model he/she is attacking. White-box
adversarial examples can be synthesized in three main settings. In the adaptive setting, the attacker
knows the model and what defense is used. In the non-adaptive setting, the attacker does not know
about the defense technique and assumes no defense is used. Finally, our experiments consider a
novel partially adaptive setting, where the attacker knows that a perturbation-based defense is being
used but does not know precisely which one.
3.2 A Unified View on Perturbations
While there is extensive work on using randomization or compression as a defense, we find that
all of the approaches essentially follow the same format. They approximate a trained network
f(·) with a less precise version fˆ(·), such that an adversarial example reverts back to the original
class: f(x) = fˆ(xadv). Intuitively, a lossy version of f introduces noise into a prediction which
dominates the strategic perturbations found by an adversarial attack procedure. It turns out that
we can characterize a number of popular defense methodologies with this basic framework. How
and where to inject noise is the core question. We model input perturbations as a general distorted
communication channel to obtain a unification of these methods. The input perturbations first
transform x through a noisy channel C(x) = C[x′ | x], and then evaluate the neural network
fˆ(x) = f(x′), where x′ ∼ C(x). One could also perturb the network itself by adding  noise to the
parameters: fˆ(x) = f(x; θˆ), where θˆ = θ +  or by injecting noise to any or all of the intermediate
layers of a network f(x) = g(h(x)), where fˆ(x) = g(h(x+ 1) + 2) (Supplement C-E).
3.3 Perturbation Analysis
Part of the goal of this experimental study is to understand the mechanism that allows such defenses
to work in the first place. We start with the hypothesis that synthesized adversarial examples
have unstable predictions–meaning that small perturbations to the input space can change
confidence values drastically—and measure quantities that will allow us to quantify this instability.
Let f(x) be a function that maps an image to a single class confidence value (i.e., a scalar output).
We want to understand how f(x) changes if x is perturbed by . We can apply a Taylor expansion of
f around the given example x:
f(x+ ) ≈ f(x) + T∇xf(x) + 1
2
T∇2xf(x)+ ...
where ∇xf(x) denotes the gradient of the function f with respect to x and ∇2xf(x) denotes the
Hessian of the function f with respect to x. The magnitude of the change in confidence is governed
by the Taylor series terms in factorially decreasing importance. δc = ‖‖2 is distortion measure. The
expression is bounded in terms of the operator norm, or the maximal change in norm that could be
induced, of each of the terms (see details in Supplement F):
T∇xf(x) + 1
2
T∇2xf(x)+ ... ≤ δc M1(x) +
1
2
δ2c M2(x) + ...
As∇xf(x) is a vector, this is simply the familiar `2 norm, and for the second-order term this is the
maximal eigenvalue:
M1(x) = ‖∇xf(x)‖2 M2(x) = λmax(∇2xf(x))
When M1 and M2 are larger this means there is a greater propensity to change the prediction for
small perturbations. We will show experimentally that for certain types of attacks the M1 and M2
values around adversarial examples exhibit signs of instability compared to those around natural
examples–suggesting a mathematical mechanism of why recovery is possible.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Experimental Setup
We run our experiments using ResNet-18, ResNet-20, or VGG-16 on CIFAR-10, ResNet-20 on
SVHN, and ResNet-50 on ImageNet using P-100 GPUs (16GB memory). We explore a number of
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different attacks that are implemented in the foolbox library [25]. In each experiment, we measure the
test accuracy (%), the confidence of predictions, and distances between the original images and either
their adversarial counterparts or the recovered images after applying one of the defenses. We present
our results for non-targeted attacks; if the adversary is successful it induces any misclassification.
For the adaptive case, we extend attacks to reduce the effects of gradient obfuscation. We approximate
the gradients for the backward pass on the compression layers (usually as an identity function), simi-
larly to [1, 16]. For the RobustNet [20] and PNI [17], the C&W attack is aware of the randomization
procedure and we use its adaptive version presented in [20]. We also use the PGD attack from [17]
and add EOT [1]. More details on the setup can be found in Supplement, Section B.
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Figure 1: Input perturba-
tions provide similar gains
in robustness. Distortion
is due to defense. Test
accuracy on clean data is
93.56% and 76.13% for
CIFAR-10 (ResNet-18) and
ImageNet (ResNet-50), re-
spectively. Defenses: FC -
Frequency-based Compres-
sion, CD is Color-Depth re-
duction (feature squeezing),
Uniform & Gaussian noise,
SVD compression.
4.2 Input Perturbation Defenses Lead to Similar Gains in Robustness
We first study the simplest class of perturbation defenses that perturb only inputs. In this experiment,
we consider the non-adaptive setting where the attacker does not know about the defense. The
attack is untargeted, any misclassification is considered a success. An interesting way to compare
very different classes of input perturbation defenses is to look at the “input distortion” (L2 distance
between the input and its perturbation, not to be confused with the distortion of the attack). We
compare this metric against the test accuracy of a defended model, which indicates the ability of the
perturbation to recover the original label.
For each image from the CIFAR-10 test and ImageNet dev sets, we generate an adversarial attack
using PGD (40 iterations with a random start) and C&W (100 iterations). The attacks are tuned to
minimize the distance between adversarial inputs and original examples. We present the results in
Figure 1. L2 distortion of 0.0 indicates no defense and the attacks reduce the test accuracy to 0%. The
defenses are applied only during inference. Each of the tested perturbation techniques can recover
a substantial portion of correct labels from the adversarial examples. They recover the accuracy to
about 85% for CIFAR-10 and 70% for ImageNet. The curves are very similar in terms of where they
achieve their peak robustness—the particular distribution of perturbations is not as relevant as their
magnitude. The “optimally-tuned” defense essentially finds the same distortion parameter across
very different stochastic and deterministic techniques.
4.3 How to Attack Input Perturbation Defenses Non-adaptively?
Input perturbation defenses might seem a simple and effective trick to make a model adversarially
robust, however, their similarity is a major pitfall. Even if the attacker does not know which particular
defense is being used he/she can still attack the model with a “less-precise” attack—one that creates
a larger distortion but higher confidence adversarial image. The experiment in Section 4.2 shows
that the defense philosophy is to generate a perturbation big enough to dominate the adversarial
perturbations but small enough to generate valid predictions. This creates an easy to recognize
attack vector, where the attacker simply makes the adversarial perturbations large enough that the
defender significantly hurts the accuracy of the model when trying to dominate the adversarially
placed strategic perturbations. Such attacks remain imperceptible (Supplement I).
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HHHHHA
D FC CD SVD Gauss Uniform Laplace
Empty 93.32 93.01 93.12 92.53 91.6 91.35
FC 0.20 80.75 83.05 81.15 79.65 78.70
CD 3.85 0.70 43.60 47.30 60.45 62.35
SVD 1.99 47.96 0.77 46.52 62.87 65.75
Gauss 4.45 48.70 44.80 51.50 61.75 60.15
Uniform 3.45 30.30 30.60 30.15 48.05 51.55
Laplace 3.05 23.35 24.60 23.80 39.15 46.70
Table 1: Transferability of
adversarial images created
using partially adaptive at-
tack (A) and tested against
defense (D). Each cell rep-
resents a recovered test ac-
curacy (%). The clean
test accuracy is 93.56% for
CIFAR-10 dataset trained
on ResNet-18 architecture.
4.4 Partially Adaptive Setting
The perturbation-based defenses fail if the attacker makes the adversarial distortion large enough.
Can an attacker still break such defenses with a low-distortion attack? One approach is to consider
the adaptive setting. If the attacker has full knowledge of the defense, it is possible to construct an
(adaptive) attack that is impervious to the defense. It has been known that many perturbation-based
defenses are easily broken in the adaptive setting.
We go one step further. Since our experiments show that input transformations are so similar in their
mechanisms, we find that an attacker does not need to be fully adaptive. To the best of our knowledge,
such a problem setting has not been studied in the previous literature. The attacker simply assumes a
particular strong perturbation-based defense and that same adversarial input often transfers to other
defenses. Our attacker assumes that the defender is using a Laplace noise perturbation to defend
the model, and generates an attack. We restrict the attacker to a single adaptive step (for details see
Section L in Supplement). Even in this weak adaptive setting, the deterministic channels are fully
broken, and the randomized channels are mostly broken (with a maximum accuracy of about 23.8%).
We can strengthen this attack by giving to an adversary a larger “compute budget”, for example, with
an unlimited number of adaptive steps (Figure 9 in Supplement) and thereby driving the accuracy to
0.
Laplace attacked images transfer the best to other defenses (Table 1). They decrease the accuracy
of the defense models by at least 44.3% (for the Laplace-based defense itself). FC attacked images
do not transfer well to other defenses and the maximum drop in accuracy of the model protected by
other defenses is 12.26%. Most adversarial images (against a given defense) transfer very well to the
FC defense. An adversarial image against any defense (e.g. CD, SVD, Gauss, Uniform, or Laplace)
is also adversarial against the FC defense. The adversarial images generated against the Uniform
defense show better transfer to other defenses in comparison to the adversarial images generated
against the Gaussian defense. This is because the higher noise level is applied in the Uniform defense.
We observe analogous trends for the ImageNet dataset (Supplement J).
4.5 Robustness to Adaptive Attacks
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Figure 2: Comparison between attacks. A. Non-adaptive attack. Adversarial images generated on
PlainNet and tested against RobustNet, FC, and BandLimited defenses. B. Adaptive. Generate the
attack with knowledge about the defenses. C. Train vs Test. The robustness of ParamNet with noise
added either during both train and test phases or only during test. D. Init vs Inner. Higher robustness
when noise layers placed before every convolutional layer (0.2 0.1) than only before the first layer
(0.2 0.0 and 0.3 0.0) or only in internal layers (0.0 0.1). We use C&W L2 attack and VGG-16 trained
on CIFAR-10.
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The previous set of experiments shows that simply adding post-hoc perturbations to a model is not an
effective defense. A crucial way to boost the robustness of perturbation based defenses is to train
the model observing training data perturbed by the future defense. This approach seems similar to
adversarial training but turns out to be much more computationally efficient as the perturbations
are usually easy to calculate. While it has been previously noted that adversarial examples can fool
multiple models [33], we find that perturbation defenses significantly affect transferability.
We test FC – the frequency-based channel with a 50% compression rate, which is one of the better
performing input perturbations in this setting. RobustNet [20] adds a random noise layer in front of
each convolutional layer (we set the noise in the initial layer (init) to 0.2, and in all the internal layers
(inner) to 0.1 as in [20]). The BandLimited model [11] modifies each convolutional layer by using
FFT-based convolutions with compression (we set the compression rate to 80%).
For the non-adaptive attack, adversarial images generated on PlainNet do not transfer to RobustNet
(see Figure 2 A). On the other hand, the BandLimited model, which is robust to Gaussian noise,
is not robust to gradient-based attacks. We observe that gradients estimated for the BandLimited
convolution operations are approximate enough and thus useful to generate the first-order attacks.
The FC defense provides even up to 50% robust accuracy in the nonadaptive setting (for L2 distortion
of 0.4), however, once we compute its gradients (similarly to the BandLimited layers) in the adaptive
setting, the accuracy of the defense drops to 0% (Figure 2 B).
In general, many defenses rely on gradient obfuscation. The latest work [31] indicates that adversarial
training suffers from gradient masking as well. Thus, we extend the adaptive case and test RobustNet
against PGD + EOT (Expectation Over Transformation) [1]. Attacking RobustNet with 10 iterations
of EOT decreases its accuracy by about 10% in comparison to the standard PGD attack. However,
there are diminishing returns for more EOT iterations (Figure 10 in Supplement). Thus, EOT helps
partially but does not allow us to find fully useful gradients to defeat the defense. This result implies
that RobustNet obfuscates the gradients by randomizing them. Another way to identify gradient
obfuscation is to check if a defense performs better against white-box than black-box attacks. It
occurs that, for example, the Boundary black-box attack [5] is unsuccessful since it executes a random
walk along (in this case) a random decision boundary (Supplement A).
4.6 Noise Injection during Train vs Test Time
RobustNet randomly perturbs inputs and feature maps. An alternative approach is to randomly
perturb parameters and we call such network a ParamNet. We investigate how much noise can be
added to ParamNet so that the clean accuracy does not decrease significantly and the robustness of
the network is improved (Figure 2 C). For a small amount of noise (σ = 0.01), the drop in clean
accuracy is negligible, however, there is no gain in robustness. Interestingly enough, a slight increase
in the amount of injected noise (to σ = 0.02) during the test phase turns the network into a random
classifier. This problem arises when the values of the parameters are dominated by random noise. To
restore clean accuracy, it is necessary to train the network with noise. We can improve robustness by
further increasing the amount of noise (σ = 0.07) but at the cost of lower accuracy on clean data.
Figure 2 D demonstrates where and how to add noise to RobustNet. Adding noise to the first layer is
essentially the same as input perturbation. We could also add noise only to the internal layers [19],
however, to achieve a high level of robustness, we have to add noise to all the layers. We also test
different types of noise: Gauss, Uniform, and Laplace injected into RobustNet. Following the general
rules established in the preceding Section 4.2, the robustness of the network is independent of the
type of injected noise (Figure 11 in Supplement).
RobustNet can be extended to an ensemble during test time by performing several forward prop-
agations, each time with different prediction scores due to the noise layers. However, we argue
that ensemble learning is not an appropriate way of increasing robustness to adversarial attacks. In
general, the ensemble method performs better than a single model if each of the ensemble models is
a good predictor. On the other hand, when a single predictor does not perform well then the ensemble
of the weak predictors magnifies the bad effect and makes the ensemble model worse than a single
predictor. For weak attacks, RobustNet performs well and its good performance is amplified by
the ensemble. For strong attacks, the RobustNet predictor performs poorly and ensemble magnifies
the errors. Additionally, from the system perspective, the ensemble for RobustNet decelerates the
inference process.
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Figure 3: White-box adaptive attacks C&W and PGD used to generate adversarial examples and
tested against the standard model (Plain) as well as the following defenses: adversarial training (Adv-
Train), parameter noise injection to the weights that uses adversarial training (PNI-W-Adv), feature
noise injection (RobustNet), and RobustNet combined with adversarial training (RobustNetAdv). We
train ResNet-20 on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets.
It occurs that RobustNet is significantly more robust than ParamNet (Figures 2 C and D). The reason
is two-fold. First, the number of parameters is an order of magnitude lower than the number of
elements in the input and intermediate feature maps [26]. Second, the standard deviations of tensors
for features are an order of magnitude higher than for parameters. Thus, a more effective amount of
variation can be added to features than to parameters.
4.7 Noise Injection and Adversarial Training
Adversarial training (AdvTrain) [22] is one of the most successful practical defenses. RobustNet
is another strong defense that injects noise into inputs and intermediate feature maps [20]. PNI-W-
Adv [17] combines noise injection into network parameters with adversarial training and can give
higher robustness than the pure AdvTrain defense. Previous Section 4.6 shows that injecting noise
into network layers performs better than noise injection into parameters. Thus, we propose to combine
RobustNet with AdvTrain (denoted as RobustNetAdv) and compare it to AdvTrain, PNI-W-Adv, and
RobustNet defense methods.
Attack Setup. We run the C&W attack with 200 iterations for the gradient descent and vary the c
parameter from 0 to 100. For all compared defenses, adversarial training uses PGD with 7 iterations,
similarly to [17, 22], the perturbation scale of 8/255 (0.031), and step size 2.55/255 (0.01). We only
vary either the number of iterations for the attack or perturbation scale  (which influences the L∞
distortion of adversarial examples). Besides using 40 and 100 total attack iterations, we also increase
the iterations to 1000 to further strengthen the adversary, similarly to [36]. The current state of the art
attack is white-box and adaptive. RobustNet and PNI-W-Adv employ the randomization techniques
so we use a modified version of attacks with EOT (Expectation Over Transformation) [1].
Noise injection requires manual fine-tuning. We tune noise layers in RobustNet. The standard
deviations of inputs to convolutional layers are guiding values for the injected noise level. To achieve
good performance, we adjust the noise separately for at least the initial and internal layers. PNI-W-
Adv goes a step further and injects noise scaled by a trained factor. The initial noise magnitude is
based on the standard deviation of network parameters. However, it requires us to adjust weights in
ensemble loss, which consists of two terms for clean data loss and adversarial data loss. Training
RobustNet in a similar manner to PNI-W-Adv usually lowers the injected noise scale too much and
makes the network much less robust.
Defense Setup. For RobustNet, we set the standard deviation σ of the injected noise to 0.2 (and 0.08)
in the input layer and 0.1 (and 0.07) in all the remaining internal layers for CIFAR-10 (and SVHN).
For RobustNetAdv, we keep the same σ = 0.1 for all the noisy layers for CIFAR-10 and use the
same 0.08 for initial and 0.07 for internal layers for SVHN. We train PNI-W-Adv in the same setup
as in [17], with the equally weighted (by 0.5) sum of losses for clean and adversarial data.
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We present the results in Fig. 3 as the test accuracy being a function of either strength of an attack or
its incurred distortion. The former approach allows us to adjust attack parameters while the latter
allows direct comparison between defenses.
A more robust network requires adversarial examples with higher distortion. For the same c
parameter in CW, the attack generates different adversarial examples depending on the attacked
network. For example, for parameter c = 0.4, the distortion required to attack RobustNet is 0.63,
whereas to attack AdvTrain, the required distortion is 0.57.
Combining adversarial training with noise injection is beneficial. AdvTrain and PNI-W-Adv are
trained against PGD and for this attack perform better than RobustNet. However, for CW, RobustNet
outperforms AdvTrain. Then, RobustNetAdv provides an improvement also in comparison to PNI-W-
Adv for CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets when using CW or PGD attacks. PNI-W-Adv is on par with
AdvTrain for CW for most distortion levels and slightly outperforms it for highly distorted examples,
similarly to RobustNet. The placement of the noise injections is important and RobustNetAdv
outperforms PNI-W-Adv in most cases.
4.8 Adversarial Examples Are Unstable
The key question is why adversarial examples are more sensitive to perturbations than natural inputs
when there is evidence that from an input perspective they are statistically indistinguishable. Our
experiments suggest that this sensitivity arises from the optimization process that generates adversarial
examples.
Based on the operator-norm analysis presented in Section 3.3, we measure L2 norm of the input
gradients w.r.t. the original xorg and adversarial xadv images for original (correct) corg and adversarial
classes cadv . For natural images, the class with the lowest input gradient is always the class with the
highest confidence. Figure 15 (in Supplement) shows that the lower the attack distortion, the more
likely a “gradient anomaly” for the adversarial example, where the lowest gradient does not correspond
to the highest confidence class. This is not surprising in retrospect—at first-order approximation,
an -sized L2 untargeted adversarial attack increases the loss L at point x by ‖∂xL(x, corg)‖2.
Analogously, at first-order approximation, an -sized L2 targeted adversarial attack decreases the loss
L at point x by ‖∂xL(x, cadv)‖2 [29]. We can systematically measure the phenomena by adding
more Gaussian noise to the original or adversarial images (Figures 12, 13 in Supplement).
We extend the second-order analysis [37] and compute Hessians with respect to inputs instead of
parameters. Our experiments show that adversarial examples lead to an order of magnitude higher
eigenvalues of the Hessians (on average) than original inputs (Figure 16 in Supplement). This
suggests that the model predictions for the adversarial inputs are less stable and random perturbations
of the adversarial images with some form of noise can easily change the classification outcome. On
the other hand, predictions for the original images are more stable and retain their correct labels when
perturbed with a small amount of random noise.
5 Conclusions
The non-adaptive attacks are not robust since small changes to adversarial inputs often recover the
correct labels. This is an obvious corollary to the very existence of adversarial examples that by
definition are relatively close to correctly predicted examples in the input space. Random perturbations
of inputs can dominate the strategically placed perturbations synthesized by an attack. The results
are consistent across both deterministic and stochastic channels that degrade the fidelity of input
examples. From the perspective of the attacker, the recovery window can be closed to make the
perturbation based techniques ineffective. Moreover, a strong input perturbation defense can be
assumed a priori to achieve high transferability of the attacks. The most effective defenses perturb not
only inputs but also the internal layers. The scale of the noise can be set as a parameter. We find that
the combination of layer perturbations and adversarial training improves robustness against adaptive
CW and PGD attacks in comparison to pure adversarial training or parameter noise injection with
adversarial training. The training of networks with strong perturbation defenses (high level of added
noise) is essential to recover the test accuracy on clean data. Our first and second-order analyses
show that the perturbation based defenses are possible since the adversarial examples are not robust
themselves.
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Broader Impact
The perturbation analyses along with the results in Section 4.8 can be useful for further theoretical
investigation of the source of instability of adversarial examples. This paper should be helpful for
practitioners in designing adversarial defenses in the future. On the other hand, the exposed attacks
might put a curb on the adaptation of machine learning systems, especially those that could directly
interact with human beings. Our method does not leverage any biases in the data.
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Figure 4: Robustness to black-box attack.
We use the Boundary attack with 25K it-
erations tested against the standard model
(Plain) as well as the following defenses:
adversarial training (AdvTrain), parame-
ter noise injection to the weights that uses
adversarial training (PNI-W-Adv), feature
noise injection (RobustNet), and RobustNet
combined with adversarial training (Robust-
NetAdv). We train ResNet-20 model on
CIFAR-10 dataset.
A Robustness to Black Box Attack
The zero-order methods do not leverage model gradients and are usually used to attack models that
we do not have direct access to. They also help to assess if a given model obfuscates gradients. We
test our models against a state-of-the-art black-box Boundary attack [5], that intuitively is based on a
random walk along a decision boundary.
It is not trivial to find an initial random adversarial example when attacking RobustNet (or PNI-W-
Adv). The Boundary attack is initialized by random adversarial examples drawn from a uniform
distribution. The uniform noise is applied many times (subject to a hyper-parameter) in different
directions. After an initial adversarial example is found, the iterative interpolation is used between the
found random adversarial example and its corresponding original image by gradually moving from the
original image towards the adversarial example until the interpolated example is misclassified. How-
ever, RobustNet applies random perturbations during inference, which becomes a non-deterministic
process that can classify differently the same image during consecutive tests. Thus, initially found
random adversarial examples might not remain adversarial for the next step of the attack. This hinders
the proper initialization of the Boundary black-box attack and causes that only about 20% of the
initially found adversarial examples remain adversarial for the main part of the algorithm.
To ensure a high rate of initial adversarial examples, we run the initialization until all examples in
a given batch are adversarial and apply 25K iterations for the main part of the algorithm, in which
random directions are explored and a similar issue to the initialization repeats. This could be partially
ameliorated by testing the same random direction many times but it makes the already expensive
algorithm a few times more costly. The Boundary attack optimizes for the L2 distance between the
adversarial and original examples, so we plot the test accuracy (%) against a wide range of possible
L2 distortions (from 0.0 to 5.0). We present the results in Figure 4.
The parameter noise injection to the weights (PNI-W-Adv) performs similarly to the RobustNetAdv
defense. Thus, an appropriate perturbation (either in parameter or feature map space), combined with
adversarial training, gives a more robust defense than either of the methods alone. The RobustNet and
PNI models are randomized models and their decision boundary is also stochastic. Thus, Boundary
attack executes the random walk on the random decision boundary and this approach fails to evade
RobustNet.
B Details on the experimental setup
We use the foolbox library [25] and borrowed the nomenclature from there. In most of our experiments,
we use the default foolbox parameters for the attacks. For example, for PGD the initial limit on the
perturbation size epsilon is set to 0.3, step size to 0.01, the default number of iterations is 40. For
Carlini & Wagner, we set the maximum number of iterations to 1000, the learning rate to 0.005,
the initial value of the constant c is 0.01. Note that for the Carlini & Wagner attack, we use the c
parameter as described in [7] and also code from [20].
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C Model
Approximating f(·) with a less precise version fˆ(·) can counter-intuitively make it more robust [12]:
f(x) = fˆ(xadv)
Intuitively, a lossy version of f introduces noise into a prediction that dominates the strategic
perturbations found by an adversarial attack procedure. It turns out that we can characterize many
popular defense methodologies with this basic framework.
Let x be an example and f be a trained neural network. Precise evaluation means running f(x)
and observing the predicted label. Imprecise evaluation involves first transforming x through a
deterministic or stochastic noise process C(x) = C[x′ | x], and then evaluating the neural network
y = f(x′) x′ ∼ C(x)
We can think of C(x) as a noisy channel (as in signal processing). The distortion of a C(x) is the
expected `2 reconstruction error:
δc = E[‖C(x)− x‖2],
which is a measure of how much information is lost passing the example through a channel.
This paper shows that there is a subtle trade-off between δc and δadv. In particular, we can find δc
such that δc >> δadv and f(x) = f(C(xadv)). We show that compression and randomization based
techniques exhibit this property.
D Deterministic perturbation techniques
D.1 Color-depth compression
When C(x) is a deterministic channel it can be thought of as a lossy compression technique. Essen-
tially, we run the following operation on each input example:
x′ = compress(x)
One form of compression for CNNs is color-depth compression. The most common image classifica-
tion neural network architectures convert the integer-valued inputs into floating-point numbers. We
abstract this process with the norm function that for each pixel n ∈ (255) maps it to a real number
v ∈ [0, 1] by normalizing the value and the corresponding denorm function that retrieves the original
integer value (where be denotes the nearest integer function) 2:
norm(n) :=
n
255
denorm(v) := b255 ∗ ve
This process is reversible v = norm(denorm(v)), but we can artificially make this process lossy.
Consider a parametrized C(·) version of the color-depth compression function:
C(v, b) :=
1
2b − 1 · b(2
b − 1) ∗ ve
By decreasing b by ∆b we reduce the fidelity of representing v by a factor of 2∆b (for the b bits of
precision).
D.2 FFT-based compression
We apply compression in the frequency domain to reduce the precision of the input images. Let x be
an input image, which has corresponding Fourier representation that re-indexes each tensor in the
frequency domain:
F [ω] = F (x[n])
This Fourier representation can be efficiently computed with an FFT. The mapping is invertible
x = F−1(F (x)). Let Mf [ω] be a discrete indicator function defined as follows:
Mf [ω] =
{
1, ω ≤ f
0, ω > f
2More complex normalization schemes exist but for ease of exposition we focus on this simple process.
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Mf [ω] is a mask that limits the F [ω] to a certain band of frequencies. f represents how much of the
frequency domain is considered. The band-limited spectrum is defined as, F [ω] ·Mf [ω], and the
band-limited filtering is defined as:
x′ = F−1(F [ω] ·Mf [ω])
D.3 SVD-based compression
Analogously to the FFT-based method, we decompose an image with SVD transformation and
reconstruct its compressed version with dominant singular values. The bases used in SVD are
adaptive and determined by an image, as opposed to the pre-selected basis used in FFT. This can
result in a higher quality for the same compression rate in the case of SVD, however, it is more
computationally intensive than FFT-based compression.
E Stochastic Perturbations
The channel model is particularly interesting when C(x) is stochastic. Randomization has also been
noted to play a big role in strong defenses in prior work [8, 20, 19, 22, 38]. For example, we could
add independent random noise to each input pixel or an internal feature map (intermediate layer):
x′ = x+ 
We consider Gaussian  ∼ N(µ = 0, σ) (with zero mean µ and σ standard deviation), additive
Uniform noise  ∼ U(−B,B) (with bound B), and Laplace noise L(µ = 0, b) (with zero mean, and
scale b), which are added independently to each pixel or an element in a feature map. One of the
advantages of randomization is that an adversary cannot anticipate how the particular channel C will
transform an input before prediction.
F Perturbation analysis: addendum
T∇xf(x) + 1
2
T∇2xf(x)+ ... ≤ δc M1(x) +
1
2
δ2c M2(x) + ...
M1(x) = ‖∇xf(x)‖2 M2(x) = λmax(∇2xf(x))
(1) T∇xf(x) ≤ δc M1(x)
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
T∇xf(x) ≤ ||||2 M1(x)
||||2 M1(x) = δadv M1(x) ≤ δc M1(x) ( since δadv << δc)
(2) ∇2xf(x) ≤ δ2c M2(x)
From the definition of maximum eigenvalue :
λmax ≥ 
T∇2xf(x)
T 
T∇2xf(x) ≤ ||||22λmax = δ2advλmax ≤ δ2cλmax
G Accuracy of Perturbation Defenses on Clean Data
One pitfall of the input perturbation defense is that it introduces errors whether or not there are any
adversarial examples. The errors act as an upper-bound for the best possible test accuracy we can get
under adversarial perturbations.
Table 2 shows the results for all test images from CIFAR-10 on the ResNet-18 architecture, for three
of the imprecise channels, and for different noise settings.
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Table 2: On CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18, we measure the max test accuracy without any adversarial
perturbation. This signifies the amount of accuracy we sacrifice with respect to the baseline clean test
accuracy 93.56% of the model (without any perturbations of the images).
FC (%) Acc. (%)
1 93.5
10 93.42
50 91.6
75 79.53
CD (bits) Acc. (%)
8 93.4
6 93.3
4 91.9
2 87.4
Uniform () Acc. (%)
0.009 93.52
0.03 92.59
0.07 85.2
0.1 70.67
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Figure 5: The test accuracy after passing clean images through six different input perturbation
defenses, where the added noise is controlled by the compression rate and epsilon parameters. We
use full CIFAR-10 test set for ResNet-18, and full ImageNet validation set for ResNet-50.
We present the results in Figure 5 for six different noisy channels; three of them are compression
based: FC, CD, SVD, and other three add different types of noise: Gauss, Uniform, and Laplace. For
each of the compression based approaches, we increase the compression rate systematically from 0 to
about 90% (in case of the CD, the compression rate is computed based on how many bits are used
per value). For the noise-based approaches, we increase the strength of the noise by controlling the
epsilon parameter  (in case of the Gaussian noise, it corresponds to the standard deviation parameter
σ).
The test accuracy of the models can be increased by training with compression, e.g., by using FFT
based convolutions with 50% compression in the frequency domain increases the accuracy to 92.32%.
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Figure 6: Distribution of deltas for input perturbation defences.
H Distributions of input perturbations
We emphasize in the paper that the distribution of noise does not matter as much as the magnitude.
To illustrate this point, we plot the distribution of deltas for six imprecise channels in Figure 6. We
compute the deltas by subtracting an original image from the perturbed adversarial image and plot
the histograms of differences. We use an image from the ImageNet dataset. For all the examples,
the correct labels were recovered. We use the C&W attack with 1000 iterations and the initial value
c = 0.01. All of the distributions are varied, yet they achieve similar robustness in the non-adaptive
setting.
I Attack Input Perturbation Defenses Non-adaptively
We present experiments for the analysis described in Section 4.3.
The attack vector against input perturbation defenses simply makes the adversarial perturbations large
enough that the defender significantly hurts the accuracy of the model when trying to dominate the
adversarially placed strategic perturbations.
This interplay is visualized in Figure 7. We use an example from the ImageNet dataset, the ResNet-50
architecture, and set the stochastic channel to the Gaussian noise. We start from an adversarial
example generated with the Carlini & Wagner (non-adaptive) L2 attack (left-hand side of each
subplot) and for consecutive subplots (in the top to bottom sequence), we increase the attack strength
and incur higher distortion of the adversarial image from the original image. For a single plot, we
increase the L2 distance of the output from the stochastic channel to the adversarial example by
increasing the Gaussian noise (controlled by its standard deviation σ and with mean µ = 0). For L2
distances incurred by different noise levels, we execute 100 predictions. We use the frequency count
and report how many times the model predicts the original, adversarial, or other class.
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Table 3: Transferability of the adversarial images that extend results from Table 1 for ImageNet
dataset. We use 30% FC compression, 50% SVD compression, 4 bit values in CD, 0.03 noise level
for Laplace, and 0.04 noise level for the Gauss and Uniform channels. We use 3000 images from the
ImageNet validation set and 100 attack iterations.
HHHHHA
D FC CD SVD Gauss Uniform Laplace
FC 0.10 75.50 75.83 77.04 77.49 76.29
CD 0.17 1.16 6.77 62.60 62.04 65.46
SVD 12.02 72.33 0.46 72.79 72.52 73.09
Gauss 0.57 26.67 6.67 58.68 58.62 64.95
Uniform 0.50 26.71 6.99 58.48 59.06 64.59
Laplace 0.33 18.59 4.16 29.76 29.84 50.00
The adversarial class is induced by a non-targeted attack. The other class is neither original (cor-
rect) nor adversarial and caused by (too much) Gaussian perturbation used in the defense. In this
experiment, we begin with an adversarial example and systematically add more Gaussian noise. The
model’s predictions change from the adversarial class, through original, and to a random other class.
The plot shows what range of distances from the adversarial image reveals the correct class. For the
adversarial examples that are very close to the original image (e.g. adversarial distance of 0.006 for
the top figure), the window of recovery (which indicates which strengths of the random noise can
recover the correct label) is relatively wide, however, as we increase the distance of the adversarial
image from the original image (by increasing the strength of the attack in consecutive plots), the
window shrinks and finally we are unable to recover the correct label. Figure 17 shows that these
large distortion attacks are still imperceptible to the human eye. To avoid any sensitivity to input
perturbation defenses, an attacker can eliminate this recovery window by generating a larger distortion
attack. Besides, statistical indications of adversarial examples should also be eschewed [27].
J Transferability of the adversarial images
The details about the setup for experiment described in Section 4.4 and Table 1.
We use 30% FC compression, 50% SVD compression, 4-bit values in CD, 0.03 noise level for Gauss
and Laplace, and 0.04 noise level for the Uniform channel. We use the ResNet-18 model, 2000
images from the CIFAR-10 test set, and 100 attack iterations with 5 binary steps to find the c value
(with initial c value set to 0.01) for the adaptive C&W L2 attack.
We also run a similar experiment for the ImageNet dataset and present results in Table 3.
K Multiple Trials For Stochastic Perturbations
Another compelling reason to use stochastic perturbations (like Uniform noise) as a defense is that it
can be run repeatedly in many random trials. We show that doing so slightly improves the efficacy of
the defense. We randomly choose 1000 images from the CIFAR-10 test set. For each of these images,
we generate an adversarial attack. We then pass each image through the same stochastic perturbation
multiple times. We take the most frequent prediction. Figure 8 illustrates the results.
Only 16 trials are needed to get a relatively strong defense. We argue that this result is significant.
Randomized defenses are difficult to attack. The attacker cannot anticipate which particular perturba-
tion to the model will happen. The downside is the potential of erratic predictions. We show that a
relatively small number of trials can greatly reduce this noise. Furthermore, the expense of running
multiple trials of a randomized defense is small relative to the expense of synthesizing an attack in
the first place.
L More Details on The White-Box Adaptive Attack
We also test RobusetNet against the adaptive PGD + EOT attack. We present the results in Figure 10.
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We test different types of noise injected into RobustNet and present results in Figure 11.
The stochastic perturbations are harder to attack with gradient-based adaptive methods. Our strategy
is to send output from the adversarial algorithm through the imprecise network and the network at
least as many times as set in the defense. We mark the attack as successful if the most frequent output
label is different from the ground truth. The more passes through the noisy channel we optimize
for, the stronger the attack. Furthermore, we run many iterations of the attack to decrease the L2
distortion. An attack that always evades the noise injection defense is more difficult to generate
because of randomization. The other randomized approach was introduced in dropout [13]. The
attacks against randomized defenses require optimization of complex loss functions, incur higher
distortion, and the attacks are not fully successful [7]. In the Figure 9, we present the result of running
attacks and defenses on CIFAR-10 data with single and many iterations. The defense with many trials
can be drawn to 0% accuracy, however, the defense not fully optimized by the adversary (single noise
injection) can result in about 40% or higher accuracy.
M Gradient-based Analysis
We start the analysis from clean images that are classified correctly. We present how the gradient
of the loss w.r.t. the input image changes for the correct class as we add the Gaussian noise to the
original image in Figure 12. The norm of the gradient smoothly increases. In Figure 13, we start
from an adversarial image found with the default C&W attack from the foolbox library. Then, we
systematically add Gaussian noise to the adversarial image and collect data on the norm of gradients
for the original and adversarial classes. The norm of the gradients for the adversarial class increases
while the norm of the gradients for the original class decreases. We cross the decision boundary to
the correct class very early and recover the correct labels for images. Then, as we add substantially
more Gaussian noise, the predictions of the classifier become random and the norms of the gradients
converge to a single value. In Figure 14, we plot the gradients also for a random class. We observe
that for an untargeted attack, the gradients for the original and adversarial classes are larger than for
the other classes. The targeted attack decreases the loss for the target class and the gradients for the
adversarial classes are lower when compared with gradients from the untargeted attacks, so fewer
images can be recovered in the former case. The targeted attack causes a smaller increase in the
norms of gradients for the original class than the untargeted attack. However, it is still higher than for
a random class.
M.1 Controlling the Gradient Magnitude
The gradient magnitude can be controlled with the confidence parameter in the C&W attack. There is
a high dependence between what confidence level is set for the attack and what the gradient norm is.
If we set the confidence to 0 (zero), then we only intend to misclassify an example, and the gradient
norms are very low (also the prediction confidence of the misclassified examples is low). The gradient
norm is w.r.t. an adversarial image for its adversarial class. If we set the confidence of the attack
to a higher level, then also the gradient is smaller for the adversarial examples and the prediction
confidence (for adversarial classes) is increased. The results are not consistent as we would expect
the highest prediction confidence for the highest attack confidence. We find that overall the attack
confidence for the C&W attack of about 1000 gives us the highest average confidence of predictions
(from the model that the given adversarial example is of the adversarial class). However, for the
attack confidence level of about 10, we can reach almost 100% prediction confidence for very high
strength of the attack. For the consecutive plots in Figure 15 we increase the confidence level for the
C&W attack. In each plot, we average confidence in predictions across images as we systematically
increase the attack strength. For the attack confidence levels 0, 10, 100, we run the experiments on
1000 images from the CIFAR-10 test set. For the attack confidence level 1000, we run the experiment
on the whole CIFAR-10 test set.
The softmax probabilities and norms of gradients are correlated for original images but not necessarily
for adversarial examples. We run the experiment for 1000 images from the CIFAR-10 dataset. The
classification accuracy on the clean data is 93.9%. Next, we take only the correctly classified images
and for each image, we generate an adversarial example using the default C&W attack from the
foolbox library (where the confidence parameter is set to zero). We record the softmax probabilities
and norms of the gradients for each of the 10 classes. For 99% of the original images, the lowest
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gradients are for the original class. Only for 1% of the adversarial examples, the lowest gradients are
for the adversarial class.
N Hessian-based Analysis
We present the Hessian spectrum in Figure 16. For the adversarial images, the eigenvalues are higher,
which indicates higher instability and proclivity to prediction changes as defined in Section 3.3.
O Visualizations of attacks and imprecise channels
Figure 17 presents a sample image from ImageNet for the Carlini-Wagner L2 attack.
P Regularization
Perturbing the inputs and internal feature maps during training is equivalent to a form of Lipschitz
regularization. However, defenses studied in the paper add noise also during inference and are not
standard forms of regularization (e.g. Tikhonov or Lasso). We do show that training the models
with the anticipated noise (that is added as a defense at inference time) is a valuable optimization
but we do not believe that this is fully a regularization effect. The techniques are also akin to data
augmentation. Furthermore, defenses such as feature squeezing are non-differentiable and do not fit
into a standard regularization framework. Finally, regularization methods have to be designed and
tuned specifically to create a strong defense.
Q Additional Experiments for black-box attacks
As a black-box attack, we define an attack that does not need knowledge about the gradient or the
model.
Q.1 Decision-based attacks
The attacks require neither gradients nor probabilities. They operate directly on the images.
Q.1.1 Robustness to Uniform and Gaussian Noise
We evaluate the robustness of band-limited CNNs. Specifically, models trained with more compres-
sion discard part of the noise by removing the high-frequency Fourier coefficients (FC channel). In
Figure 18, we show the test accuracy for input images perturbed with different levels of uniform
and Gaussian noise, which is controlled systematically by the sigma parameter, fed into models
trained with different compression levels (i.e., 0%, 50%, or 85%) and methods (i.e., band-limited vs.
RPA-based3). Our results demonstrate that models trained with higher compression are more robust
to the inserted noise. Interestingly, band-limited CNNs also outperform the RPA-based method and
under-fitted models (e.g., via early stopping), which do not exhibit the robustness to noise.
Input test images are perturbed with uniform or Gaussian noise, where the sigma parameter is
changed from 0 to 1 or 0 to 2, respectively. The more band-limited model, the more robust it is to the
introduced noise.
Q.1.2 Contrast Reduction Attack
This black-box attack gradually distorts all the pixels:
target =
max + min
2
perturbed = (1− ) ∗ image +  ∗ target
3The Reduced Precision Arithmetic, where operations on 16-bit floats are used instead of on 32 or 64-bit
float numbers.
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where min and max values are computed across all pixels of images in the dataset.
We can defend the attack with CD (Color Depth reduction) until a certain value of epsilon, but then
every pixel is perturbed smoothly so there are no high-frequency coefficients increased in the FFT
domain of the image. The contrast reduction attack becomes a low-frequency based attack when
considered in the frequency domain. Another way to defend the attack is to run a high-pass filter in
the frequency domain instead of the low-pass filter.
We run the experiments for different models with CD and two band-limited models (the model with
full spectra and no compression as well as a model with 85% of compression - with FC layers). The
CD does defend the attack to some extent and the fewer pixels per channel (the stronger the CD in a
model), the more robust the model is against the contrast reduction attack.
Test accuracy as a function of the contrast reduction attack for ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 (after 350
epochs) is plotted in Figure 18. We control the strength of the attack with parameter epsilon that
is changed systematically from 0.0 to 1.0. We use the whole test set for CIFAR-10. R denotes the
number of values used per channel (e.g., R=32 means that we use 32 values instead of standard 256).
Q.1.3 Multiple pixels attack
The foolbox library supports a single-pixel attack, where a given pixel is set to white or black. A
certain number of pixels (e.g., 1000) is chosen and each of them is checked separately if it can lead
to the misclassification of the image. The natural extension is to increase the number of pixels to
be perturbed, in a case where the single-pixel attack does not succeed. We present results for the
multiple pixel attack in Figure 18.
Q.2 Spatial-based attacks
Spatial attacks apply adversarial rotations and translations that can be easily added to the data
augmentation during training. However, these attacks are defended neither by removing the high-
frequency coefficients nor by quantization (CD) . We separately apply rotation by changing its angle
from 0 to 20 degrees and do the translations within a horizontal and vertical limit of shifted pixels
(Figure 18).
Q.3 Score-based attacks
The score based attack requires access to the model predictions and its probabilities (the inputs to the
softmax) or the logits to estimate the gradients.
Q.3.1 Local Search Attack
The local search attack estimates the sensitivity of individual pixels by applying extreme perturbations
and observing the effect on the probability of the correct class. Next, it perturbs the pixels to which
the model is most sensitive. The procedure is repeated until the image is misclassified, searching for
additional critical pixels in the neighborhood of previously found ones. We run the experiments for
the attack on 100 test images from CIFAR-10 since the attack is relatively slow (Figure 18).
R Other domains
We replicated our experiments on time-series data from the UCR archive and results suggest a similar
relationship between perturbation and adversarial robustness. On an ECG dataset using the CW
L2-norm attack, we observe that: (1) there is similarly a narrow recovery window of L2 distortions
ranging from 0.7 to 1.6 where the perturbation is a successful defense, and (2) layer-perturbation
methods are the most effective adaptive defense.
We use NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax1 dataset. A 3-layer RobustNet based on FCN architecture for
time-series data is set with noise levels 0.06, 0.05, 0.05. The results show that combining adversarial
training with RobustNet gives superior performance. We used Adv. Training with strength 0.04 (i.e.,
max L∞ norm for 7 step PGD attack).
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Figure 7: Frequency of model predictions for original, adversarial, and other classes as we increase
the attack strength.
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Figure 8: For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we run multiple trials of the uniform noise perturbation and
take the most frequent prediction. We further test multiple noise levels. The multiple trials improve
overall accuracy for different noise levels significantly. After 128 trials for the best setting we are
within 3% of the overall model accuracy (of about 93.5%).
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Figure 9: For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we run multiple trials of the uniform noise perturbation and take
the most frequent prediction in the defense (many noise iterations). We also run just a single noise
injection and return the predicated label. The attacker runs the same number of many uniform trials
as the defender. The experiment is run on 100 images, with 100 C&W L2 attack iterations.
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Figure 10: PGD + EOT. We use the PGD attack with 40 iterations and EOT with different number of
iterations tested against RobustNet. We train ResNet-20 model on CIFAR-10 dataset. Clean accuracy
is 88%.
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Figure 11: Different types of noise for RobustNet. We use the PGD attack with 40 iterations. We
train ResNet-20 model on CIFAR-10 dataset. Clean accuracy is 88%. The Gauss, Uniform, and
Laplace noise provide the same robustness.
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Figure 12: The changes in the L2 norm of the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the input image x for the
correct class corg as we add Gaussian noise to the original image. The experiment is run on 1000
images from the ImageNet dataset.
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030
σ (strength of the Gaussian noise)
0
5
10
15
E x
||∂
x(
x,
c)
|| 2
gauss image org class
gauss image adv class
original image org class
adv image (C&W) adv class
Figure 13: The changes in the L2 norm of the gradient for the correct class corg and the adversarial
class cadv as we add Gaussian noise to the adversarial image generated with C&W L2 attack. The
experiment is run on 1000 images from the CIFAR-10 dataset.
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Figure 14: The changes in the L2 norm of the gradient of the loss for the correct class corg, the
adversarial class cadv, and a random class cran as we add Gaussian noise to the adversarial image
generated with C&W L2 attack. The experiment is run on 1000 images from the CIFAR-10 dataset.
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Figure 15: Dependence between confidence levels of the CW attack and gradients of the generated
adversarial examples.
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Figure 16: Histogram of top eigenvalues of the Hessians w.r.t. the input 1024 images from the
CIFAR-10 dataset trained on the ResNet-18 architecture.
Figure 17: We plot a sample image from the ImageNet dataset in its original state, after adversarial
(white-box, non-adaptive C&W L2) attack, and then after recovery via imprecise channels: CD
(color depth reduction with 32 bits), FC (30% compression in the frequency domain), Gaussian, and
uniform noise ( = 0.03).
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Figure 18: Test accuracy as a function of the strenghts of the attacks for ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10.
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